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HarvarJosef Parnas, MD, PhD, and Mads Gram Henriksen, PhDLearning Objectives: After participating in this activity, learners should be better able to:
1. Assess anomalous self-experience as a core feature of schizophrenia spectrum disorders.
2. Evaluate current and historical research regarding disorders of self-experience in schizophrenia.
Abstract: This article explores the phenomenological and empirical rediscovery of anomalous self-experience as a core
feature of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders and presents the current status of research in this field. Historically, a dis-
ordered self was considered to be a constitutive phenotype of schizophrenia. Although the notion of a disordered self has
continued to appear occasionally over the years—mainly in the phenomenologically or psychodynamically oriented
literature—this notion was usually considered as a theoretical construct rather than as referring to concretely lived anom-
alous experiences. Empirical research on the disorders of self-experience in schizophrenia can be traced back to the US-
Denmark psychopathological collaboration in thewell-known adoption and high-risk studies, which aimed at identifying
trait or phenotypic vulnerability features. This research was later followed by clinical work with first-admission schizo-
phrenia patients. We offer clinical descriptions of anomalous self-experience and outline the phenomenological struc-
tures of subjectivity that are needed for grasping the nature of these anomalous experiential phenomena. What
appears to underlie these experiences is an instability of the first-person perspective that threatens the basic experience
of being a self-coinciding, embodied, demarcated, and persisting subject of awareness. We summarize a series of empir-
ical studies targeting self-experience in schizophrenia performed prior to and after the construction of a phenomenolog-
ically oriented psychometric instrument for assessing anomalies of self-experience, the Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience (EASE). These empirical studies support the classic clinical intuition that anomalous self-experiences form a
central phenotype of schizophrenia. Implications for diagnosis and research are briefly discussed.
Keywords: empirical studies, Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE), phenomenology, schizophrenia,
self-disordersT
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has implications for the nosology of schizophrenia and for
efforts to identify etiologically relevant phenotypes, and it has
potentially important clinical consequences regarding early
diagnosis, differential diagnosis, and therapeutic approaches
to the disease.
In addition to reviewing the empirical literature, we empha-
size the clinical and scientific roots of these particular research
efforts and also their evolution and conceptual continuity with
both classic andmore recent, phenomenologically oriented em-
pirical studies of schizophrenia. This research is also a product
of interdisciplinary collaboration between psychopathology,
philosophy ofmind, and phenomenology. The interdisciplinary
andmixed clinical and scientific backgroundmeans that the re-
search also is relevant to the current debate on the status of psy-
chiatry as a science and a profession.1 This heated debate,
triggeredmost recently by the release of theDiagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM]-5 and the prepara-
tions for the International Classification of Diseases [ICD]-11,
has been fueled by a widespread disappointment with psy-
chiatry’s lack of etiological and therapeutic progress2—a lack
partly attributed to the DSM’s rigid “diagnostic silos.”3,4www.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org 251
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The earliest—and quite sophisticated—psychopathological
descriptions of anomalous self-experience appeared in French
psychiatry at the turn of the twentieth century,5,6 but they
were never associatedwith dementia praecox or schizophrenia
because these latter concepts emerged only later in the French
classification of mental disorders. By contrast, explicit refer-
ences to a disordered self, considered as the fundamental phe-
notype of schizophrenia, are present in nearly all foundational
texts on the disease, though using various terms and with
varying clarity. For example, Kraepelin considered “disunity
of consciousness” to be the core feature of schizophrenia.7 To
grasp the link between selfhood and “unity of consciousness,”
consider the following example.My current field of conscious-
ness, as I am typing this essay, comprises heterogeneous dimen-
sions, including thinking, perception, movement, and visual,
tactile, and proprioceptive stimuli. Their coherence, or “unity,”
is established by the fact that they are all my experiences; that
is, they all appear in a single field of awareness, that of a single
subject—namely, me.8
Eugen Bleuler listed the experiential “ego disorders”
among the “complex fundamental” (diagnostic, or almost pa-
thognomonic) schizophrenic symptoms.9 Karl Jaspers ob-
served that for the patient with schizophrenia, the sense of
self-presence was fundamentally weakened: “Descartes’ ‘co-
gito ergo sum’ (I think therefore I am)may still be superficially
cogitated but it is no longer a valid experience” (emphasis
added).10(p122) Kurt Schneider considered a “radical qualita-
tive change” of the field of consciousness to be a generative
matrix of the first-rank symptoms: “[Certain] disturbances
of self-experience show the greatest degree of schizophrenic
specificity. Here we refer to those disturbances of first perso-
nal givenness (Ich-heit) or ‘mineness’ (Meinhaftigkeit).”11(p58)
The interest in disorders of the self in schizophrenia
persisted in phenomenological psychiatry (e.g., Minkowski,12
Ey,13 Laing,14 Kimura,15,16 Sass17) and in psychodynamically
oriented theoretical contributions and case studies. The ICD-8
and -9 diagnostic prototypes, valid until 1992, described
schizophrenia as a “fundamental disturbance of the personal-
ity, which involves its most basic functions, those that give
the normal person his feeling of individuality, uniqueness,
and self-direction” (emphasis added).18,19(p27) Note that the
ICD-8/9 term “personality,” borrowed from the writings of
Karl Jaspers and Kurt Schneider, actually originated in
nineteenth-century psychiatry and psychology, where it signi-
fied what we today tend to call the “self” or “subjectivity,”
and not the contemporary concept of personality, which refers
to temperamental and habitual characterological dispositions.
Despite continuing interest in the self and its experiential
distortions in schizophrenia, research that was systematic
and empirical remained largely absent through the end of
the twentieth century. The only notable exception is the
recent work (1995) by the Swiss psychiatrist Christian
Scharfetter,20 who developed self-rating scales for measuring
the psychotic alteration of the sense of self—using dimensions252 www.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org
Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard College. Uof selfhood originally proposed by Jaspers—over the symp-
tomatic course of the schizophrenic psychosis.
The publication of DSM-III in 1980,21 which completed
the so-called operational revolution in psychiatry, involved
a behavioristic, subjectivity-aversive stance that emphasized
“observable features, demanding only a minimum of infer-
ence,” and that radically privileged reliability over valid-
ity.22 The issue of subjectivity or self vanished from the
canonical discourse on the nature of schizophrenia and from
the research agendas. That is not to say, of course, that the
notion of self completely disappeared from the literature on
schizophrenia. It continued to appear occasionally, though
not as an anomalous experience accessible to description or
study, but as a theoretical construct, a metaphor, or a meta-
cognitive locus in cognitive science. Consequently, we stress
that the research discussed in this article relates not to an ab-
stract or inferred construct of the self but to an experientially
disordered self—that is, a concretely lived, experiential phe-
nomenon (phenotype) that is accessible to empirical and phe-
nomenological observation and analysis.CLINICAL AND RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The contemporary Copenhagen research on self-disorders in
schizophrenia has its roots in the collaborative US-Denmark
studies on adoption,23,24 high-risk populations,25 and linkage.26
These research projects focused on detecting characteristic,
phenotypic traits that represent the psychopathological fea-
tures of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The diagnostic
portion of these studies employed various standard semi-
structured interviews, and the psychiatrists performing these
interviews were all senior, consultant-level clinicians who
were trained in the tenets of psychiatric phenomenology
and in phenomenological interview methods.10,27 The adop-
tion studies demonstrated the role of genes in the etiology of
schizophrenia and led to the emergence of the “spectrum”
concept, reviving the old concept of “schizoidia”28 and
thereby providing the empirical foundation for the diagnos-
tic category of schizotypal disorders, which was introduced
in DSM-III. The US-Denmark high-risk prospective longitu-
dinal study25 (involving 207offspring of schizophrenicmothers)
identified the following adolescent (age 15) premorbid pre-
dictors adult diagnostic outcome on the schizophrenia spec-
trum (i.e., schizophrenia; other nonorganic, nonaffective
psychosis; and schizotypal disorders): deficient interpersonal
emotional rapport, eccentric appearance or behavior, subtle
formal thought disorder, social isolation, and interpersonal
difficulties.29–32 These results seemed to fit into Bleuler’s
and Meehl’s intuition that the (autistic) “fundamental traits”
in schizophrenia are manifest in the expressive, interpersonal,
and communicative-symbolic space.9,33 These traits were con-
sidered as the phenotypic core of vulnerability to schizophrenia
in the diathesis-stress models of the illness—a model articu-
lated in 1927 by E´ugene Minkowski, a French psychiatrist
and a pupil of Eugen Bleuler:Volume 22 • Number 5 • September/October 2014
nauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
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HarvThe notion of schizophrenia as a mental disease can
be decomposed into two factors of different order.
First, the schizoidia [the clinical core], which is a con-
stitutional, highly specific, and temporally enduring
factor, and, second, a nonspecific noxious factor of
[environmental] evolutive nature. This noxious fac-
tor, acting upon the [vulnerability of] schizoidia,
transforms the latter into schizophrenia.*,12(pp50–51)Independently, writing in 1962, Paul Meehl33 presented a
new version of this diathesis-stress model, in which schizo-
phrenia was considered a severely decompensated schizotypal
disorder influenced by environmental stressors and polyge-
netic factors. In his account the core schizotypal features
(i.e., ambivalence, social aversiveness, cognitive slippage
[formal thought disorder], and anhedonia) were considered
to be proximally tied to the neural substrate of the illness.
Likewise, the Copenhagen High-Risk Project indicated
affinities between these core features and the notion of
“schizophrenic autism,” a concept from Bleuler9 but subse-
quently rearticulated by phenomenological psychiatry in a
clinically more useful and adequate way.34 On that view
the core of schizophrenic autism is not a defensive withdrawal
to inner fantasy life (as Bleuler seemed to suggest)9(p63) but
a lack of a basic, automatic, and nonreflective attunement
in the individual’s self-, other-, and world-relation.34–36 In
addition to manifesting itself as a series of “external” or be-
havioral signs, this lack of attunement invariably entails
a profound change of subjective experience.12,34,35,37–39
Blankenburg’s famous patient, Anne, presents the following
frequently quoted complaint that dramatically illustrates this
personal milieu (which Blankenburg interprets as a “crisis of
common sense” or “lack of natural self-evidence”):What is it that I ammissing? It is something so small,
but strange, it is something so important. It is impos-
sible to live without it. I find that I no longer have
footing in the world. I have lost a hold in regard to
the simplest, everyday things. It seems that I lack a
natural understanding for what is matter of course
and obvious to others . . . Every person knows how
to behave, to take a direction, or to think something
specific . . . [A]ll these involve rules that the person
follows. I am not able to recognize what these rules
are. I ammissing the basics . . . I don’t know what to
call this . . . It is not knowledge . . . Every child knows
these things!38(pp307–08)PRELIMINARIES: CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS
When reading Blankenburg’s vignette, a natural question
comes to mind: how is it like to be the subject lacking this
basic foothold in the world? This question inspired two
explorative, phenomenologically oriented studies of first-
admission schizophrenia spectrum patients in Denmark40slation and bracketed insertions by authors.
ard Review of Psychiatry
Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard Colleand Norway.41 These (and later) studies demonstrated that
the majority of young, first-admitted schizophrenia spec-
trum patients complained of not feeling truly alive, not
fully existing, lacking their innermost identity, and being fun-
damentally, though ineffably, different from others (a feeling
often expressed through childhood fantasies of being time
travelers or extraterrestrials, or of having biological parents
other than the ones they were being raised by. What distin-
guishes this basic feeling of being different or “wrong” in
the schizophrenia spectrum disorders from the apparently
similar feelings in other conditions is that this sense of being
different cannot be articulated in terms of concrete,mundane
characteristics such as feeling stupid, being too fat or not well
dressed, having unusual interests, or coming from another
socioeconomic background than one’s peers. Instead, what
the patient struggles to describe is a basic sense of being on-
tologically different (different in kind) or of living in another
ontological dimension; as an illustration, one of our patients
said, “I do not feel like a spiritual being. It is as if I am a phys-
ical object; for example, like this radiator.” Put in another
way, this sense of being different puts one’s own humanity
in question; another patient of ours reported that while
growing up, she often wondered if she was actually a robot.
Another aspect of this disordered self is a typically deficient
sense of “mineness” of the field of awareness, as in “my
thoughts are strange and have no respect for me.” This phe-
nomenon is often closely related to various distortions of the
first-person perspective; for example, “my point of view seems
to tremble slightly, moves backwards . . .”). Patients also fre-
quently describe a hyper-reflective attitude to their own expe-
riences: thoughts, feelings, or sense impressions are regarded
or inspected from afar as objects of awareness rather than sim-
ply “lived through.” One patient distinguished between “be-
ing thoughts,” when these thoughts were permeated by her
sense of self, and “having thoughts,” when thoughts were ex-
perienced as introspectible, thing-like objects. There may also
be different forms of disembodiment (e.g., “there is a split be-
tween my mind and my body” or “it feels as if my body does
not really fit”) and quasi-solipsistic experiences, usually with a
fleeting sense of being at the center of the world or that one’s
experiential field is the only extant reality.
The disorders at the subject- or self-pole of experience are
typically also associated with deformations at the “world
pole,” as vividly described by Blankenburg’s patient Anne:
the lack of immersion in the surrounding world; the ques-
tioning of what others consider obvious or self-evident (often
reflected in questions such as “why is the grass green?” or
“why do people say ‘hello’ to each other?”); varieties
of derealization; and alienation from the social world. In
phenomenological terms, the basic or foundational pre-
reflective articulation of the subject-object intentional relation
has gone astray.42 Self-disorders, as described above, are
sometimes enacted through altered or strange existential pat-
terns, including solipsistic grandiosity, bizarre attitudes and
actions, “double bookkeeping” (i.e., the capacity to inhabitwww.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org 253
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J. Parnas and M. G. Henriksenboth the psychotic and real worlds at once), mannerist behav-
iors, or a search for a new existential or metaphysical meaning
(e.g., adherence to sectarian political or religious groups).43–45
A few additional clinical observations merit attention here.
First, anomalous self-experiences (self-disorders) have
mainly a persisting, trait-like character. The notion of trait
phenotype is usually applied to persistent expressive or behav-
ioral features (e.g., persistent subtle formal thought disorder
or inadequate affective modulation). In the case of experien-
tial (subjective) phenomena such as self-disorders, the trait-
like character of the anomalous self-experiences lies in their
tendency to articulate themselves as a constant or recurring in-
frastructure of the patient’s conscious life—an infrastructure
that determinesmore the form of experience (the how of expe-
rience) than the particular contents of experience (thewhat of
experience). For example, what is distinctive about thought
pressure is not that the patient has particular thoughts at a
given moment but that the patient frequently experiences,
say, several thematically unrelated trains of thought occurring
chaotically at the same time and without his or her control. In
sum, self-disorders are to a large extent structural aspects of
subjective life that are, based on what the patients describe,
never far away (as a potentiality) from their ongoing stream
of experience. Very often, patients report that self-disorders
date back to childhood or early adolescence. By the same to-
ken, at the time of patients’ first admission, many self-
disorders have become almost indistinctly interwoven into pa-
tients’ mode of experiencing. At least partly for this reason,
patients seldom seem to experience their initial self-disorders
as “symptoms” of an illness (parallel to severe abdominal pain
as a potential symptom of pancreatitis) but rather as intrinsic
features of their existence and how they experience them-
selves, others, and the world—which might present a new
framework for understanding poor insight into illness in
schizophrenia.45 Moreover, self-disorders not only precede
the onset of psychosis but also seem to persist after remission
of a frank psychotic episode.
Second, we are not dealing here with psychotic phenomena.
Self-disorders, no matter how strangely they are experienced,
do not simply become elaborated at a psychotic level, although
the articulation of psychosis in schizophrenia is related to the
initial self-disorders.45 Self-disorders are typically verbally re-
ported with the “as if” qualification (e.g., “it feels as if I am
without a soul” or “I feel as if the thoughts aren’t really coming
fromme”). That is, the reflective reality judgment is still intact.
Third, many patients whom we have interviewed over
the years seem to consider self-disorders as the very core of
their illness and as contributing more to their suffering than
the symptoms of psychosis.41 Frequently, patients are sur-
prised to learn that the psychiatrist is familiar with their ex-
periences, and they may become profoundly relieved after
realizing that others also have similar experiences. Patients
with an antecedent psychiatric history often express surprise
that nobody ever asked them the necessary questions about
their subjective life and way of experiencing. In this context254 www.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org
Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard College. Uit is worth noting that the alleviation of the feeling of existen-
tial solitude—albeit only partial or temporary—that comes
to patients when they address their self-disorders may itself
be of therapeutic value.
Finally, we emphasize that this kind of information
about patients’ experience of their self-disorders cannot be
obtained by a series of structured questions on a checklist.
Rather, it requires a phenomenologically adequate inter-
viewing approach that seeks to establish rapport and trust,
and inwhich the active inquiry into the concrete phenomena,
including examples and self-descriptions, is adequately and
smoothly integrated into the patient’s own narrative.46 It is
clinically important to recognize that the patient’s initial
complaints are often in the nature of vague or nonspecific cli-
che´s that may be a shorthand for more specific complaints.
Blankenburg termed this phenomenon the “non-specific
specificity.”37,47 Often, only when the patient is asked for a
concretely lived example of his (nonspecific) complaint does
a more characteristic (and specific) configuration of anoma-
lous experience emerge. For example, a patient complaining
of “fatigue” may, upon prompting, report the constant, op-
pressive burden of a reflective, energy-consuming effort to
decode and understand the meanings of ordinary, everyday
conversations (in this case “fatigue” covers anomalous self-
experiences, including loss of common sense, perplexity,
and hyper-reflection). Another patient, complaining about
“concentration difficulties,” may, upon request, describe
these difficulties as rooted in several thematically unrelated
and chaotic trains of thought that occur at the same time
and that he can neither stop nor control, thus making it al-
most impossible to concentrate on something else. The psy-
chiatrist’s acquaintance with the phenomenon of “non-
specific specificity”37,47 is, in our view, extremely important
in the context of early diagnostic assessment, especially of
patients presenting with a vague, unelaborated picture of
maladjustment, underperformance, chronicmalaise anddyspho-
ria, negative symptoms, or hypochondriac preoccupations.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF DISORDERED SELF
The empirical studies on self-disorders, which we review in
detail below, jointly point toward an instability of the very
basic sense of self in schizophrenia spectrum disorders (i.e.,
schizophrenia and schizotypal disorders). This instability
does not, however, equal a lack or dissolution of the self
(which perhaps may only occur in severe cases of catatonia).
Thus, a patient suffering from a disordered sense of self con-
tinues to be a subject of awareness and to affirm himself or
herself with the first personal pronoun “I.” In other words,
patients experience self-disorders within an overarching
experiential-existential perspective that constitutes their
being-in-the-world; no matter how vulnerable the patients
may be or howmany self-disorders they are exposed to, their
lives remain full and complete forms of human existence. The
terms “instability” or “dis-order” indicate, however, that
the normally tacit, taken-for-granted, pre-reflective, andVolume 22 • Number 5 • September/October 2014
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Disordered Self in the Schizophrenia Spectrumpre-conceptual sense of being a subject of awareness no lon-
ger saturates one’s experiences in the usual, unproblematic
way. Rather, in schizophrenia spectrum disorders the basic
sense of self appears to be fragile, threatened, and oscillat-
ing. But what does this basic sense of self more specifically
amount to? To answer this question, psychiatry must go be-
yond its own confines and draw on resources particularly
from philosophy of mind and phenomenology. Grasping
consciousness is not like grasping a spatial object or thing.
The basic sense of self signifies that we each live our
conscious life as a self-present, single, temporally persistent,
bodily, and demarcated (bounded) subject of experience
and action.10,48 To articulate the most basic or irreducible di-
mension of selfhood, phenomenology49 and the cognitive sci-
ences50 operate with the notions of a “minimal” or “core”
self; that is, a necessary structure that must be in place in
order for any experience to be experienced as someone’s
experience (in contrast to, say, the experience existing in a
sort of free-floating state and only post hoc appropriated by
the subject in an act of reflection). The basic (or minimal)
sense of self is experientially, but pre-reflectively, manifest.
It refers to the first-personal articulation of experiencing,
typically called “mineness,” “myness,” “for-me-ness,” or
“ipseity.”42,49,51 The term “ipseity” (in Latin, ipse = self)
conveys that all experiences are tacitly or pre-reflectively
lived as my experiences—that is, from my first-person per-
spective. Yet the notion of a mere or pure perspective does
not exhaust the sense of ipseity. This notion also has a more
substantial aspect in which the sense of “I-me-myself” per-
sists over time and across different and changing modali-
ties of conscious life. It is immediately, pre-reflectively, and
non-inferentially given or present as a founding stratum
of our experiential life. This sense of “I-me-myself” is
property-less; that is, it cannot be further described with a se-
ries of adjectives or attributes.Wemay even say that “if intel-
ligibility is grasping properties, then the ‘myself’ . . . eludes
our grasp.”52(p310) From a phenomenological perspective,
ipseity or the self does not “show up” in our experiences as
a sort of object or quasi-object toward which we may direct
our attention. Thus, ipseity is not a product of reflection, in-
trospection, or meta-representational mental activity but a
passively emerging first-person configuration of experience.
Ipseity has been compared to a flame that enlightens its sur-
roundings and thereby itself.53(p173) In other words, ipseity
cannot be defined or grasped independently from the stream
of consciousness in which it manifests itself as a specific
structural configuration of that stream.
Ipseity is a precondition of more rich and complex feelings
of identity. It signifies that I am always already aware of my-
self and that I therefore have no need for introspection, self-
observation, or self-reflection to assure myself of being myself
or being the one who entertains these thoughts or undergoes
these experiences. Ipseity conveys a foundational, immutable
core that is necessary for our sense of existing as a self-present,
bodily, demarcated, and persisting subject of awareness. Thus,Harvard Review of Psychiatry
Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard Colleipseity exhibits a paradoxical nature; it may be considered as a
general, universal form of consciousness, while also, notwith-
standing its lack of properties, serving as themost intimate, in-
dividuated core of our personal identity.52 Ipseity thus needs
to be distinguished from fuller, more complex notions of the
self (e.g., the so-called narrative, extended, or personal self).
And our central claim is that schizophrenia spectrum disor-
ders involve a selective disturbance of ipseity,42,51 though it
may also, in turn, influence those more complex levels of
the self. By contrast, personality disorders outside the schizo-
phrenia spectrum seem, in our view, to reflect disturbances at
the more complex, self-representational or narrative levels of
selfhood,54 leaving ipseity largely unaffected.
Today, various approaches—including the phenomeno-
logical, existential, psychoanalytical, and metacognitive—
as well as autobiographical reports55–57 suggest that schizo-
phrenia involves a diminished sense of self. The meaning of
the term “self,” however, and how it may be “diminished”
in schizophrenia seems to differ markedly from one author
to the next. To elucidate the distinctness of our own hy-
pothesis, we will briefly compare it to another theoretical
proposal: the so-called dialogical model of the self (as devel-
oped by Paul and John Lysaker).58 On that model, a “sense
of self involves a disclosure of the self-as-X,”58(p63) where
the “X” refers to what is termed (1) a “character-position”
(e.g., self-as-citizen), (2) an “organism-position” (e.g., self-
as-hungry), or (3) a “meta-position” (e.g., self-as-
fortunate).58(pp54,63) According to Lysaker and Lysaker, a
sense of self emerges from a dynamic interplay (or “dia-
logue”) between these three self-positions. On this model,
the diminished sense of self in schizophrenia results from a
relative loss of an ordered, interanimating play among these
three self-positions,58(p74) each of which has its own attri-
butes. This approach contrasts sharplywith the viewwe have
presented here, according to which schizophrenia spectrum
disorders involve a disturbance of ipseity—an instability
of the normally tacit, pre-reflective, and pre-predicative
founding stratum of our experiential life that is property-
less and that resists further qualification. Our proposal and
the proposal by Lysaker and Lysaker target different dimen-
sions or levels of self-experience.
Finally, we note that our proposal is not necessarily at
odds with brain- or metacognitive-based models of the self
in schizophrenia. The difference is that the latter tend to posit
disruptions of the self as resulting from failures of higher-
order capacities, whereas we suggest that the sense of self in
schizophrenia is often diminished at the level of immediate,
first-order experience.
EARLY EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Data-collection instruments in the early (pre-2005) self-
disorders research included the forerunners of the Bonn
Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (BSABS)59 and
the final, published version of the BSABS (translated into
Danish),60 which had been expanded to include a few itemswww.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org 255
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Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard College. Unthat were explicitly designed to target anomalous self-
experience. The BSABS is a comprehensive, semi-structured
interview scheme that assesses various anomalies of experi-
ence (affective, volitional, cognitive, perceptual, and bodily),
each illustrated by patient-derived prototypical statements.
The empirical studies during this early period are presented
in Table 1. The BSABS, used in many of those studies, has
been found to have satisfactory reliability.63
A central, joint finding of the empirical studies was
that self-disorders aggregated selectively among the first-
admission patients diagnosed with ICD-10 schizophrenia
and schizotypal disorder as compared to patients with other
psychiatric diagnoses.62 In a five-year follow-up of this par-
ticular clinical sample, high levels of self-disorders at base-
line in patients with a first-admission diagnosis outside the
schizophrenia spectrum predicted subsequent diagnostic
transition into the schizophrenia spectrum; by contrast, the
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale scores on the canoni-
cal dimensions of schizophrenia symptomatology were
unpredictive.68 In another study, which compared a group
of patients with residual/remitted schizophrenia to a group
of remitted psychotic bipolar patients, a significant aggrega-
tion of self-disorders was found in the former group.61 The
selective aggregation of self-disorders within the schizophre-
nia spectrum was replicated in a large population sample
comprising six extended families at high genetic risk for
schizophrenia.65 The individuals with DSM-III-R schizo-
phrenia or schizotypal disorder proved to have higher levels
of self-disorders than the individuals with other psychiatric
diagnoses or those with no clinical diagnosis.64 Most inter-
estingly, when the healthy control group (note that all sub-
jects were related to a schizophrenia proband) was later
divided into those individuals exhibiting one or few schizo-
typal features (but without qualifying for any psychiatric di-
agnosis) and those completely free of schizotypal traits, it
was found that the former group scored significantly higher
on the self-disorders scale—a finding consistent with the
view of self-disorders as an aspect of vulnerability.67
Finally, Parnas and colleagues69 applied the concept of
self-disorders to the data from the Copenhagen High-Risk
Project—in particular, by selecting the items from the
premorbid Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
assessment that, if voiced as a complaint in a clinical con-
text, would trigger an in-depth assessment of a correspond-
ing EASE-item (see next section). This MMPI-derived self-
disorder scale (Cronbachs alpha > 0.9) successfully di-
scriminated a lifetime diagnostic outcome of schizophrenia
spectrum disorders (i.e., schizophrenia and schizotypal per-
sonality disorder) versus nomental illness among the genet-
ically predisposed individuals.
EASE-BASED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
In 2005, a semi-structured psychometric instrument for
a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anoma-
lies of self-experience—the Examination of AnomalousVolume 22 • Number 5 • September/October 2014
authorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Table 2
EASE-Related Studies and Diagnosis of Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders
Study Sample Purpose Results
Haug et al. (2012)75 DSM-IV (all first referrals for
adequate treatment):
Schizophrenia spectrum
psychosisa (n = 57)
Bipolar psychosisb (n = 21)
Other psychotic disordersc
(n = 13)
To test the discriminatory power
of EASE with respect to
schizophrenia and
non–schizophrenia spectrum
psychosis
Anomalous self-experiences,
measured by the total EASE
score, discriminate
schizophrenia spectrum
psychosisa (mean EASE = 25.3)
from bipolar psychosisb (mean
EASE = 6.3) and other psychotic
disordersc (mean EASE = 11.5)
Raballo & Parnas (2012)73 ICD-10 (all first admissions
for suspected psychotic
condition):
Schizophrenia (n = 19)
Schizotypal disorder (n = 8)
Non–schizophrenia
spectrum disordersd (n = 9)
To test the discriminative power
of EASE with respect to
schizophrenia spectrum and
non–schizophrenia spectrum
disordersd
Anomalous self-experiences,
measured by the total EASE
score, discriminate
schizophrenia (mean
EASE = 21.4) and schizotypal
disorder (mean EASE = 17.0)
from non–schizophrenia
spectrum disordersd (mean
EASE = 5.7)
Nordgaard & Parnas (2014)72 DSM-IV (all first-admission
patients):
Schizophrenia
spectrum psychosisa (n = 46)
Schizotypal personality
disorder (n = 22)
Other mental disorders
(n = 32)
To test (1) the discriminative
power of EASE with respect to
schizophrenia spectrum
(schizophrenia spectrum
psychosisa and schizotypal
personality disorder) and
non-spectrum disorders, and
(2) the difference in EASE scores
of schizophrenia spectrum
psychosisa and schizotypal
personality disorder
Anomalous self-experiences,
measured by the total EASE
score, discriminate
schizophrenia spectrum
disorders (schizophrenia
spectrum psychosisa and
schizotypal personality disorder)
from other mental disorders
(mean EASE = 8.1)
No differencewas found between
the total EASE scores of
schizophrenia spectrum
psychosisa (mean EASE = 19.6)
and schizotypal personality
disorder (mean EASE = 17.8)
a Schizophrenia, schizophreniform, and schizoaffective disorder.
b Bipolar disorder I and bipolar disorder NOS.
c Delusional disorder and psychosis NOS.
d Various affective disorders.
DSM, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; EASE, Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience; ICD-10, International Classification of Dis-
eases, 10th rev.; NOS, not otherwise specified.
Disordered Self in the Schizophrenia SpectrumSelf-Experience (EASE)—was published.70 Senior psychi-
atrists from three European countries collaborated in
constructing the EASE, which also included conceptual
input from philosophy of mind and phenomenology.
The selection of the scale items was based on the com-
bined experience of clinical units for first-admitted pa-
tients, reflected detailed reviews of English, French,
German, and Scandinavian psychopathological litera-
ture, and took into account the data collected in the avail-
able pre-EASE empirical studies (see Table 1). The
construction process also included the authors’ joint dis-
cussions of videotaped psychopathological assessments,
conducted individually by the EASE’s Danish authors, of
40 selected patients with potential self-disorders.Harvard Review of Psychiatry
Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard ColleThe EASE contains 57main items, sometimes divided into
subtypes. Each item is briefly defined and illustrated by pro-
totypical examples of complaints. The items are aggregated
into five rationally cohesive sections: (1) Cognition and
Stream of Consciousness, (2) Self-Awareness and Presence,
(3) Bodily Experiences, (4) Demarcation/Transitivism,
(5) Existential Reorientation. The EASE exhibits high inter-
nal consistency,71,72 amonofactorial structure,72,73 and good
to excellent interrater reliability among trained and experi-
enced psychiatrists or clinical psychologists.70,71,74
Several studies have now explored the association of
EASE scores with psychiatric diagnoses (see Table 2). In
samples comprising patients with ICD-10 or DSM-IV
schizophrenia, schizotypal disorder, and other non-spectrumwww.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org 259
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Table 3
Miscellaneous EASE Studies
Study Sample Purpose Results
Škodlar et al. (2010)76 DSM-IVand ICD-10:
Schizophrenia (n = 25)
To test the correlation
between EASE scores and
suicidality
A correlation was found
between EASE domain 2
scores and suicidal plans
and ideation, and solitude
and inferiority feelings
Møller et al. (2011)71 25 first-episode psychosis patients To estimate the internal
consistency, overall
interrater correlation, and
item interrater agreement
of EASE
The EASE had good to
excellent internal
consistency across the
two raters and an overall
interrater correlation
above .80
The average kappa of the
EASE was .65, ranging
from .51 to .73 over its five
domains; kappa values at
an item level were very
good in 9 items, good in
20 items, moderate in 11
items, and fair in 4 items
Haug et al. (2012)77 DSM-IV (all first-admission patients):
Schizophrenia (n = 38)
Schizoaffective disorder (n = 9)
Schizophreniform disorder (n = 2)
To test if EASE scores are
correlated with suicidality
in first-episode
schizophrenia spectrum
disorders and if such a
correlation is mediated by
depression
A correlation was found
between suicidality,
depression, and
anomalous self-experiences
The effect of anomalous
self-experiences, measured
as the total EASE score, on
current suicidality was
mediated by depression
Haug et al. (2012)78 DSM-IV (all patients in early phase
of treatment):
Schizophrenia (n = 57)
To explore cross-sectional
correlation patterns
between EASE scores and
neurocognitive functions
(psychomotor speed;
working, visual, and verbal
memory; and executive
functions)
A correlation was found
between the total EASE
score and verbal
memory (i.e., high total
EASE scores were
associated with impaired
verbal memory)
No other significant
correlations were found
Nelson et al. (2012)74 49 patients with ultra-high risk for psychosis
and 52 healthy controls
To (1) compare the
distribution of anomalous
self-experiences in
ultra-high-risk patients vs.
controls, and (2) test if
baseline EASE scores in the
ultra-high-risk group were
predictive of later
transition to psychosis at
follow-up (mean = 569
days)
Anomalous self-experiences
aggregate in the ultra-
high-risk patients (EASE
mean = 42.02)a but not
in the control group
(EASE mean = 2.37)
At follow-up, 13
ultra-high-risk patients
had transitioned to
psychosis (26.5% of the
original sample); the total
EASE score, the EASE
domain 1 score, and the
EASE domain 2 score
were found to predict
transition to a psychotic
disorder
Continued on next page
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Table 3
Continued
Study Sample Purpose Results
Raballo & Parnas (2012)73 ICD-10 (all first admissions with a
suspected psychotic condition):
Schizophrenia (n = 19)
Schizotypal disorder (n = 8)
Non–schizophrenia spectrum disordersb (n = 9)
To test the psychometric
properties of EASE
The EASE was found to
have good to excellent
(.85–.90) internal
consistency across the
diagnostic groups and
an overall excellent
alpha (>.90) in the
sample
Correlations between
EASE total score and
single domain scores, as
well as inter-domain
correlations, ranged from
moderate to very strong
Koren et al. (2013)79 82 help-seeking, nonpsychotic
adolescents (aged 14–18 years)
To test the correlation
between EASE scores and
subclinical prodromal
symptoms assessed with
the Prodromal
Questionnaire80
The EASE was found to
be moderately
correlated to the
Prodromal
Questionnaire’s80
positive and negative
symptom scales, and
modestly to its
disorganized scale
Nelson et al. (2013)54 42 patients with ultra-high risk for psychosis To test the correlation
between EASE scores and
borderline personality
pathology
No correlation was
found between EASE
scores and borderline
personality pathology
Haug et al. (2014)81 DSM-IV (all referred for
first adequate treatment):
Schizophrenia spectrum
psychosisc (n = 56)
Bipolar psychosisd (n = 20)
To assess cross-sectional
correlation patterns
between several
psychopathological and
social-function measures
Correlations were found
between EASE scores
and social dysfunction
Nordgaard & Parnas (2014)72 DSM-IV (all first-admission patients):
Schizophrenia spectrum psychosis
(n = 46)
Schizotypal personality disorder (n = 22)
Other mental disorders (n = 32)
To test correlations
between EASE scores and
other measures of
psychopathology, IQ, and
duration of untreated
psychosis and illness
Positive correlations
were found between
EASE scores and positive
and negative
syndromes, formal
thought disorders, and
disturbances of
perception
No correlation was
found between EASE
scores and duration of
untreated psychosis,
duration of illness, or IQ
(Cronbach’s alpha of
EASE = .903)
a The high mean EASE total score of the ultra-high-risk group reflects, most likely, a methodological approach different from the one used in the other EASE
studies reported in this table. In the latter studies, only main EASE items were included and analyzed (i.e., when sub-items occurred, they were collapsed into
their main items), and all “questionably present” items were systematically recoded as “not present.”
b Various affective disorders.
c Schizophrenia, schizophreniform, and schizoaffective disorder.
d Bipolar disorder I and bipolar disorder NOS.
DSM, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; EASE, Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience; ICD-10, International Classification of Dis-
eases, 10th rev.; NOS, not otherwise specified.
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J. Parnas and M. G. Henriksenmental disorders, Raballo and Parnas73 and Nordgaard and
Parnas72 successfully replicated the results from the pre-
EASE empirical studies,62,64 thus finding a significant, selec-
tive aggregation of self-disorders among the schizophrenia
spectrum patients. Additionally, the patients with schizophre-
nia and schizotypal disorders had similar levels of self-disorders.
Haug and colleagues75 examined a sample of first-episode
psychosis patients diagnosed with DSM-IV schizophrenia,
bipolar psychosis, or other psychotic disorders. They found
that high EASE scores markedly and significantly differenti-
ated schizophrenia from the two other groups. This effect
remained significant after controlling for severity differences
in positive and negative symptoms.
A range of empirical studies has explored correlations be-
tween EASE scores and other measures such as those for
psychopathology (see Table 3). In samples of patients with
schizophrenia, Sˇkodlar and colleagues76 and Haug and col-
leagues77 found a correlation between self-disorders and mea-
sures of suicidality. In another study, Haug and colleagues78
found no correlation between self-disorders and neurocog-
nitive measures except for impaired verbal memory, and
Nordgaard and Parnas73 found no correlation between self-
disorders and IQ. Haug and colleagues81 found that elevated
levels of self-disorders were independently associated with
poorer social functioning in schizophrenia and bipolar disor-
der; the study controlled for relevant factors such as pre-
morbid adjustment, duration of untreated psychosis, negative
symptoms, neurocognitive function, and diagnosis. Koren
and colleagues79 identified self-disorders among nonpsy-
chotic, help-seeking adolescents (aged 14–18 years) and
found that self-disorders correlated with subclinical prodro-
mal symptoms. The symptomatic distribution identified three
separate groups of adolescents: one with prodromal symp-
toms only, one with prodromal symptoms and self-disorders,
and one with self-disorders only. Nelson and colleagues74
demonstrated that elevated EASE scores at baseline predicted
psychosis outcome in a sample of subjects at ultra-high risk for
psychosis subjects. In a related study,54 they found no correla-
tion between the borderline dimension of psychopathology
and self-disorders, suggesting that the EASE-measured self-
disorders are of a different kind than the self-related problems
characteristic of borderline personality disorder and per-
haps also other personality disorders outside the schizophre-
nia spectrum. Sass and colleagues82 conducted an interesting
theoretical-comparative study of the similarities and differ-
ences between selected literature reports on depersonalization
and the anomalous self-experiences identified through the
EASE. They concluded that erosion of the first-person per-
spective appeared specific to schizophrenia.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The presented research supports the notion of disturbances of
specific structures of consciousness as important phenotypes
of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders, thus corroborating
the clinical intuitions of those who first identified them. A262 www.harvardreviewofpsychiatry.org
Copyright @ 2014 President and Fellows of Harvard College. Uself-evident conclusion is that much empirical and conceptual
work lies ahead of us. Most importantly, the temporal stabil-
ity of self-disorders and their trait-like status need systematic
longitudinal investigations. In our view, the central issues
concern the nosological status and the diagnostic boundaries
of schizophrenia and schizotypal conditions, along with the
consequences of understanding how important self-disorders
are in understanding these phenomena. For many years, we
have witnessed a rebirth of a unitary view of psychosis, col-
lapsing schizophrenia and psychotic affective illness into
one disorder. This assumption is typically legitimized by find-
ings of certain genetic and neurocognitive commonalities,
and it is supported by the graded distributions of positive
and negative symptoms (assessed by standard checklists),
with absent “points of rarity.” As we have recently argued
at some length elsewhere,39,83,84 however, the original pro-
totypical (founding) definition of schizophrenia was not
based on a number of specific psychotic symptoms but ra-
ther relied on the identification of a characteristic trait or ge-
stalt, predominantly marked by peculiarities or strangeness
in the expressive, communicative, and symbolic spaces.
Many metaphors were employed or even invented to de-
scribe this particular gestalt—for example, discordance,
intra-psychic ataxia, autism, loss of vital contact with reality,
and cognitive dysmetria. This gestalt is intrinsically elusive
and resists any simple, straightforward attempt to define it.39
In characterizing a phenotypic gestalt for schizophrenia,
we need not only to take into account its expressive, external
features or signs, but to grasp a certain whole that is jointly
constituted by its “outer” and the “inner” aspects. We must
recognize that the patient’s structures of subjectivity are pro-
foundly different, even thoughwemay not be able to verbalize
this difference in precise terms. In other words, we not only
register the external signs but also sense an inner change (what
might be called the symptoms). What we sometimes perceive
as incomprehensible or strange in the interaction with such a
patient is therefore not solely due to a disorder of expressivity,
operating as a somewhat autonomous series of signs (e.g., in-
appropriate affect). Rather, the perceived strangeness is also
reflective of, and codetermined by, the altered structures of
subjectivity. It is in this particular context that a phenomeno-
logically coherent notion of a disorder of the self, itemized into
its multiple empirical aspects in the EASE scale, permits a
more focused, targeted, and explicitly articulated (and there-
fore reliable) investigation and description of the psychopath-
ological aspects of the schizophrenic gestalt. Until now, these
dimensions of the gestalt have been dismissed as too “atmo-
spheric,” “intuitive,” or “subjective” to be useful either scien-
tifically or clinically. The notion of self-disorder, however,
presents a more specific, articulated, and robust demarcation
of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Not only is this de-
marcation based on central psychopathological consider-
ations, but it can play a crucial role in etiological and
pathogenetic research.85–87 The diagnostic notion of self-
disorder also has important implications clinically—forVolume 22 • Number 5 • September/October 2014
nauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Disordered Self in the Schizophrenia Spectrumexample, in early detection and differential diagnosis.88,89
Finally, it seems to us that psychotherapeutic approaches
that are intimately informed about the specific nature
of the patient’s suffering are likely to have better thera-
peutic success.90
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